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THE APPLICABILITY OF CONTENT-BASED
TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER REGULATIONS
TO OFFENSIVE LANGUAGE: THE BURGER
DECADE
Harold Quadres*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Analyzing the Supreme Court's treatment of constitutional issues relating to freedom of expression in the last decade is troublesome, for the Court has adopted an inconsistent
attitude toward previously developed judicial techniques in
the free speech area. The Court is apparently extending first
amendment protection to some types of expression which, because of either the form used to convey the message or the
content of the message itself, traditionally have not been considered first amendment speech at all.' At the same time, the
Court sanctioned the regulation of admittedly protected
speech, i.e. time, place, and manner restrictions based upon
the content of speech, a practice that historically has been
constitutionally forbidden.'
Yet the Court's approach, on further analysis, may not be
so inconsistent. It may instead be viewed as a judicial attempt
to recognize certain previously ignored free speech values
without compromising governmental interests particularly
threatened by these newly recognized types of speech. These
threatened interests are the same ones that led earlier courts
to consider this newly recognized expression to be unworthy
of constitutional protection.8 . In effect, the Court has created
o
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1. Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)
(commercial speech); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15 (1971) (offensive speech).
2. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Young v. American MiniTheaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976). But see Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972).
3. For example, Valentine v. Chrestenson, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), held that com-
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certain categories of expression which are partially protected
by the first amendment. In so doing, however, the Court has
given itself a difficult, and perhaps ill-conceived, task of deciding the quantum of partial protection that any given type
of speech warrants. The Court must value particular speech to
decide how much state regulation should be sanctioned.
The purpose of this article is to take a retrospective look
at the treatment of these issues during the first ten years of
the Burger Court. The article will attempt to trace the development of this analytical approach, concentrating on that particular area of expression often called "offensive language," to
determine whether such speech has been given constitutional
protection, how much protection it has been given, and under
what conditions such speech may be restricted or suppressed.
Finally, the approach itself, and the difficulties in applying it,
will be evaluated, with a consideration of where the Burger
Court may ultimately be heading.

II.

THE WARREN COURT LEGACY

The Warren Court consistently treated the dual themes
of this article as totally separable issues. In deciding whether
any particular form of expression deserved to be constitutionally protected, the Warren Court adopted, and indeed perfected, a "two-tier" approach to the analysis of free speech
issues.4 Those tiers were defined as: (1) speech that deserved
full first amendment protection and (2) speech that deserved
no protection at all. Concurrently, and without reference to
the considerations which were used in relegating a given expression to its proper tier, the Warren Court also confirmed
the principle that speech falling within the upper tier could
not be subjected to any content dependent restrictions relating to the time, place, or manner of its dissemination.5
mercial advertisements were not protected by the first amendment when prohibited
by a municipal ordinance. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), held that the consumer's right to information in a commercial advertisement outweighed the state's interest in regulating the conduct of a
professional group like pharmacists.

4. This has been referred to in commentary as a "two-level" theory of speech
protection. See Kalven, Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 2 PUBLISHING ENTERTAINMENT ADVERTISING L.Q. 439 (1963).
5. See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana (I), 379
U.S. 536 (1965).
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The Two-Tier Theory

The creation of the two-tier theory allowed the Warren
Court to decide free speech questions with a convenient twostep approach. The first step consisted of deciding whether
the expression involved in the-case , be it verbal expression or
the communicative aspects of conduct, 6 deserved either firsttier or second-tier protection. If the speech was found to belong to one of the narrowly defined classes of unprotected expression, it was not deemed first amendment speech at all.7 As
such, it could be regulated or suppressed by the state so long
as the state's action was sufficiently rational to satisfy minimal substantive due process limitations.' If the speech involved did not fall within one of the classes of unprotected
speech, and a regulation was based in any way on the message
aspect of such speech, the first amendment drastically limited
the state's power to regulate such expression. Thus, the first
step of the Court's analysis was strictly definitional, and it offered an approach that was attractive, if for no other reason
than its apparent simplicity. The analysis presumed that the
Court would not have to involve itself in the mire of judicial
balancing that is so often criticized as legislative secondguessing. 10 It would not have to engage itself in a case-by-case
consideration of the relative value of the regulated expression
weighed against the state's justification for such regulation.
Yet the apparent simplicity of the two-tier approach may
have been something of a false promise. Admittedly, the
6. The degree of protection given the communicative aspects of conduct is beyond the scope of this article. Compare Cox v. Louisiana (II), 379 U.S. 559 (1965)
with Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 299 (1963). The relationship between manner of expression and form of expression is relevant, however. The use of loudspeakers might be considered conduct or a manner of expression. See, Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77 (1949). A speaker's choice of words might be considered a manner of
expression or a form of expression, and the classification may determine thedegree to
which the state may control such choice. Compare Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
25-26 (1971) with FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 743 n.18 (1978).
7. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (obscenity not constitutionally protected); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (libel); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (fighting words not protected).
8. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 642-43 (1968); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266-67 (1952).
9. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1942) (grave
and immediate danger); Linmark Assoc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97
(1977) (emergency).
10. See, Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 784-90 (1945) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Court has had little difficulty labeling the classes of speech
that are not deserving of first amendment protection.1 1 Perhaps aware that the result of an actual case may be preordained by such classification, the Court has had great difficulty defining the contours of unprotected classifications,12 as
well as in applying definitional contours to particular facts
even when the definitional boundaries were thought relatively
precise."

In fact, it may be argued that the two-tier approach has
not enabled the Court to escape the painful burden of balancing after all. Rather, a hidden balancing of free speech values
versus permissible state interests may be covertly occurring in
the "classification" step of the analysis rather than overtly occurring in the later "regulation justification" step. The Court
thus approaches the second step with the scale tipped. In
many classes of unprotected speech, the Court has deemed
the underlying value of the speech to be so classified so as to
be negligible, if not nonexistent,14 and consequently, that such
expression has no place in the "marketplace" of ideas. In
others, the Court has presumed such speech to pose a sufficient potential harm' to justify suppression, and thus has ac11. Those classes, prior to the Burger Court, were: offensive or fighting words
(Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)); obscenity (Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)); commercial speech (Valentine v. Chrestenson, 316 U.S.
52 (1942)); libel (Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952)); and, arguably, advocacy of lawless action (Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)).
12. Compare Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) with Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (definition of obscenity). Compare Beaulharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250 (1942) with New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (definition of
actionable libel). Compare Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (definition of illegal advocacy).
13. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring, admitting he could never intelligibly define obscenity, but stating that he knew it when he
saw it).
14. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (Murphy, J.):
"Such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." See Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (no redeeming social value).
15. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
16. It is arguable that the Court never deemed commercial speech to be totally
without social value, but rather that it felt the danger of false or misleading advertisements posed special problems that justified enhanced state control in the area.
See Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Similarly, in the area of illegal advocacy, the Court has seemed to base its decision on
the fact that such expression poses potentially severe harm rather than on the fact
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cepted the state's rationale for suppressing the speech interest
without strict judicial scrutiny."
However, toward the end of the Warren era"8 and to an
even greater extent in the early years of the Burger Decade,
the Court's attitude appears uncertain towards the asumption
that the certain types of expression that meet the definitional
criteria can be said to have absolutely no free speech value.
The Court has come to recognize that commercial speech,1"
speech once considered subject to common law slander or libel
liability,"0 and indecent or offensive speech,2 1 may have valid
communicative value in certain contexts, even if they do pose
the harmful threats the Court has also described. If these
types of expression have some value, then they deserve at
least some first amendment protection. However, the Court itself may not clearly comprehend what "some" means in this
context. The remainder of this article deals with this question
in the context of offensive language. It examines how the Burger Court has treated such language, given that it may have
some value, but also may still pose harm.
B.

The Use of Content-Oriented Regulation of Expression

Given the preferred position2 2 of speech among the rights
directly or indirectly protected by the Constitution, it has
been generally accepted by modern Supreme Courts that the
content of protected expression may be regulated by the state
only if the state can present an exceptionally worthy or compelling2 justification for doing so. Yet the Court has recognized that a state may have valid interests totally indepenthat it is totally valueless. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
17. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266-67 (1952); Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 642-43 (1968) (extreme judicial deference to possible justifications).
18. The Warren Court was the first to reassess the protection given libelous
expression. See New York Times Co v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
19. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Viginia Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809
(1975).
20. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Associated Press v.

Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
21. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15 (1971).
22. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937); see United States v.
Carolene Products. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); see also McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1182 (1959).
23. See note 8 supra. See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
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dent of the content of speech that would never be considered
compelling. 4 The Court historically has allowed the state to
protect neutral interests through regulations in pursuance
thereof,2 5 so long as applied equally to all forms of expression,
irrespective of the content, meaning, or message of the speech
involved.26 Such statutes are aimed at the conduct that often
accompanies the dissemination of ideas, though there are
speech-neutral regulations that are aimed at the manner of
expression rather than accompanying conduct.2 7 So long as
such statutes are not aimed at the suppression of a particular
message, nor treat different speakers differently based upon
their message, the Court has subjected those statutes to a
lesser degree of judicial scrutiny than applicable to restrictions of particular content. However, the Court has never
adopted a position of complete judicial deference to the state
when free speech is involved. Even when the state is regulating conduct, or neutrally regulating speech, the Court will invoke an independent judicial weighing of competing interests
if the statute has an inhibitory, even though only incidental,
effect upon speech interests.2 8
If there existed any particular area of speech where state
attempts to regulate the time, place, or manner of expression
would become inevitably involved with speech content, the
area of indecent or offensive language would have appeared
predestined. Though arguably a case where the manner of expression, rather than the content of the message, impinges on
24. See, e.g., Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (disruption near school
grounds); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1948) (limits on noise); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (control of streets).
25. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U.S. 569 (1941); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
26. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92 (1972). See generally, Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First
Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20 (1976).
27. Such laws, however, are often related to the physical manner of dissemination, which independently could be treated as a form of conduct. See Saia v. New
york, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (loudspeakers). Cf. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205, 212 n.9 (1975) (law aimed at preventing light or sound from drive-in movie
theaters). See note 5 supra.
28. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 336 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961). The independent
balancing will often result in a finding that the particular state interest thought to be
valid, is not sufficient to overcome the incidental deterrent effects of the regulation
upon expression. See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (interest in
preventing fraud will not justify requirement of identification on handbills).
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particular state interests,2" that manner nevertheless relates
to the words or images involved in conveying the message
rather than the manner of its physical dissemination. Thus,
offensive language cases are quite unlike situations involving
the use of loudspeakers, where the state is regulating the
physical means by which the words that communicate a mes30
sage are projected.
So long as offensive language is considered to be unprotected speech, the state may rationally regulate it or prohibit
it altogether without forcing a court to discern whether the
state is restricting only the manner or form of expression, as
distinguished from content. However, if offensive language is
deemed to have sufficient social worth to deserve constitutional protection, the problem becomes more complex. If such
speech is given full first-tier protection, then the state's power
to restrict its content is narrowly limited. To allow the state
the power to excise offensive words, and call such excision a
neutral regulation of the manner of speech, presumes that
form of expression and message content are totally separable.
Such an approach presumes that a state can purify the form
without altering the content.
If the two-tier theory of the Warren Court is retained,
and a court finds that form and content are not so easily separated, a dilemma will occur. If offensive language is given
first-tier protection, the state will have no power to regulate
offensive words without a showing that they pose a clear and
present danger. If the courts abandon the two-tier approach,
however, there is an alternative. An intermediate class of partially protected speech could be created, one that would allow
the state to determine the time, place, and physical manner of
disseminating speech based upon the verbal form of expression or the content of the message.
The degree to which the state may look to the content of
speech in applying a time, place, or manner regulation constitutes the second major theme of this article. Both this issue,
and the other major element of the article, the judicial treatment of offensive language, surfaced in the early years of the
Burger Court, but they continued to be treated indepen29. Compare the majority opinion in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726,
742 n.18 (1978) (Stevens, J.), with the dissent, id. at 772-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
30. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
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dently. It was not until the later years of the Burger Decade
that the limited protection given offensive expression, and the
allowance of content-oriented judgments concerning time,
place, and manner statutes, would dovetail into significant
constitutional cases.
III.
A.

THE EARLY BURGER COURT

Offensive Language

The Burger Court, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,"'
appeared to give birth to the doctrine that certain speech
could be prohibited solely for its offensiveness; however, the
opinion said little concerning the state interests that might
justify such action. Beyond the implication that, by definition,
the mere utterance of such speech could be said to inflict an
injury to its recipients' sensibilities, the state interests were
not critically examined.82
The Burger Court squarely faced the question of state interests in Cohen v. California," both in a manner and with a
result that has cast doubt upon the position of offensive
speech in two-tier analysis, and perhaps the whole use of the
two-tier doctrine. In Cohen, the Court was faced with speech
that it recognized as being phrased in a potentially offensive
manner,"' but which it also recognized as conveying a message. Having done so, the Court made it clear that a state's
ability to render certain words as beyond the pale of the first
amendment merely by classifying them as indecent or offensive per se would not be tolerated. It clearly rejected the concept that the form of expression could be prohibited merely
upon a showing that such form was used.36 Rather, the Court
explicitly adopted a balancing process, concentrating on the
facts of the particular case. The circumstances surrounding
31. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
32. Id. at 572.
33. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
34. The defendant in Cohen entered a courthouse wearing a jacket bearing the
words "Fuck the Draft." There were women and children present in the corridor. The
defendant testified he intended to inform the public of the depths of his feelings
against the Vietnam War and the draft. Id. at 16.
The Court recognized that the particular word involved here was "perhaps more
distasteful than most others of its genre." Id. at 25.
35. Id. at 18.
36. Id. at 20, 26.
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the use of such words would have to be considered, the state
interests justifying regulation enunciated, and a proper balance struck between the state's interests and the restrictions
on free speech.
In Cohen, the Court addressed, at least indirectly, nearly
all of the possible institutional justifications for regulating offensive language. They are generally: (1) the protection of audience sensibilities, the interest most obviously suggested by
Chaplinsky;s7 (2) the protection of substantial privacy interests, an issue normally associated with an unwilling recipient;"8 (3) the protection of children;3 9 (4) the enhanced power
of the state to regulate expression due to the nature of a particular forum;' 0 and (5) the state's power to exorcise certain
offensive language from the public discourse in the interest of
public morality.'
With respect to the state's interest in protecting the sensitivities of unwilling or unsuspecting viewers, Justice Harlan
felt that so long as such viewers were outside of the home, the
speaker's right of expression must prevail, given that members
of the audience could avoid a distasteful expression merely by
averting their eyes.42 His analysis, however, appeared to be
aimed at the problems presented by the unwilling viewer,
rather than the unsuspecting viewer. His solution protected
audience sensitivities from further offense, but it did not protect them from the initial offense. Thus, one might argue that
43
the Court felt this latter harm to be somewhat insubstantial.
However, if the audience were truly captive, avoidance could
37. 315 U.S. 568.
38. See Saia v. New York City, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
see also Black, He Cannot Choose but Hear: The Plight of the Captive Auditor, 53
COLUM. L. REv. 960 (1953); Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to be
Spoken to?, 67 Nw. U. L. REV. 153 (1972).
39. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (obscenity re children); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) (obscenity; overturned as too restrictive of adult

rights).
40. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (broadcasting media); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (jailhouse); see also Greer v. Spock, 424
U.S. 828 (1976) (military base); Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (municipal bus system).
41. A similar form of protection has since been recognized by the Court in its
treatment of obscene expression thought not limited to the linguistic atmosphere. See
Paris Adult Theaters I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973).
42. 403 U.S. at 21.
43. Id. (unwitting as opposed to unwilling listeners). But cf. FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978) (avoiding assault after the first blow).
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be impractical or impossible, and the state might have the
power to limit the use of certain forms of expression." Moreover, should such expression invade the sanctuary of the
home, substantial privacy interests could be invaded.4 5
Significantly, the Court left open the question of whether
the plaintiff in Cohen could have been punished for violating
a statute narrowly designed to specifically protect the interests of children.' 6 Similarly, the Court implied that a statute
designed to specifically protect the decorous atmosphere of a
courthouse might have been valid in this case.'
The majority opinion dealt more decisively with the claim
that a state may act to protect the level of public discourse by
excising certain words from the public vocabulary. In effect,
Justice Harlan recognized the normally insurmountable difficulty in separating form from content: suppressing certain
words without suppressing the underlying ideas themselves.4"
Although it may be asserted that the plaintiff in Cohen could
have stated his message in a different way, it is less assertable
that he could have as effectively conveyed it. Even if the
Court deemed itself capable of making the latter judgment,
which is a debatable assumption, a decision upholding the
state's power to limit the words a speaker may use gives no
weight to the speaker's right to choose the form of expression
which is deemed to be most effective, either in carrying the
message to the audience,' 9 or in best-evoking the speaker's
44. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 22. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (inability of
listener to shut out loudspeaker); See, e.g., Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298
(1976) (Douglas, J., concurring).
45. 403 U.S. at 21.
46. The Court quoted the California Penal Code which provided, at § 415:
Every person who maliciously and wilfully disturbs the peace or quiet
• . .by tumultous or offensive conduct . . ., or who use[s] any vulgar,
profane, or indecent language within the presence or bearing of women
or children, in a loud and boisterous manner, is guilty of a misdemeanor
403 U.S. at 16 n.1. Section 415 was amended in 1974 to eliminate the reference to
"women or children." CAL. PENAL CODE § 415 (Deering 1975). In Cohen, defendant
was convicted of disturbing the peace by offensive conduct. 403 U.S. at 16.
47. 403 U.S. at 19 (statute makes no distinction between locations; no fair
warning).
48. Gratuitously offensive language, i.e., the use of indecent words that are
merely appended to the actual message of the speaker, could be treated differently.
See In re WUHY-FM, Eastern Educational Radio, 24 F.C.C. 2d 408 (1970).
49. 403 U.S. at 25. While distinguishing between the cognitive and emotive
value of particular words, the Court assumes that the latter value may protect the
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own feelings. This latter right, to express a message in a manner that best connotes the inner mixture of the speaker's
thoughts, emotions, and feelings, creates a theoretical impossibility for the state or a court to substitute its judgment.
Certainly, Cohen left a number of questions unanswered.
The decision does not explicitly elevate offensive language to
the level of other protected speech. Rather, it is an endorsement of judicial balancing, carrying with it the possibility
that, in certain circumstances, such language might be subject
to sanctions inapplicable to other first amendment expression.
Yet, Cohen still must be viewed as taking a stance decidedly
in favor of free speech. Even if no more than a matter of form,
the Court's approach expresses a judicial decision to overtly
demonstrate the balancing process that may have been used
covertly in earlier cases that merely classified speech as either
protected or not. But, if offensive language has not been given
full first amendment protection, then the Cohen decision
poses problems in its application. The case did not clarify
whether the language was not offensive at all, or whether it
was offensive but nonetheless justified in the particular situation. In the former case, the Court had not abandoned its definitional approach after all; it had merely undertaken the task
of deciding in particular instances whether the expression involved should be considered offensive, an approach which has
proved markedly unsuccessful in the regulation of obscene
language.6 0 In the latter case, Cohen seems to leave open the
possibility that the protection of offensive speech may be balanced away. If so, a variety of factors not clearly placed into
the balance become very relevant, including those that the
Court left open in Cohen and those that the Court did not
mention: the availability of alternate forums for the speaker,
the rights of a willing audience to receive rather than to avoid
51
certain messages, and the relevance of the speaker's intent.
Yet the basic holding of Cohen, that it is beyond the
former. Id. Which value is the source of the state's harm deserves consideration. If it
is the cognitive or denotative meaning, meanings will change and expand, causing the
state's harm to become imprecise. Certainly, Cohen's expression could not be given
its clear denotative meaning. See Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 23 n.17
(D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
50. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 78-93 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
51. See Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting
mem.).
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power of the state to impose general standards of acceptability on communications, 2 has been confirmed.'
B.

Content-Oriented Speech Regulations

In a case which, at the time, had little relationship to the
issues posed in Cohen, the Burger Court gave a strong endorsement to the proposition that attempts by the state to
regulate the time, place, and manner of protected expression
must be content-neutral. That is, the state, when faced with
first amendment speech, could not channel such expression
toward or away from any particular time or place if the direction depended on the content or message of the speech. Police
Department of Chicago v. Mosley " involved a city ordinance
that forbade picketing near school buildings during school
hours. The ordinance specifically exempted picketing by labor
organizations if a school were involved in a labor dispute."
This exemption, in effect, excluded one type of message from
the ordinance's overall prohibition. The Court found the statute impermissible as written, since it effectively granted a certain group the right to exercise free expression at a time and
place prohibited to all other groups, solely on the basis of the
content of the message. As Justice Marshall stated: "The operative distinction is the message on a picket sign. But, above
all else, the First Amendment means government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content."5 6
This holding was heavily buttressed by the equal protec52. 403 U.S. at 25; See Organization For a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415
(1971).
53. Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518
(1972) (invalidating law prohibiting opprobrious words or abusive language on
grounds of overbreadth since not limited to the punishment of fighting words). Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972). See also Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S.
130 (1974); Plummer v. Columbus, 414 U.S. 2 (1973).

54. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
55. CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE c.193-1(i) (March 26, 1968), provided:
A person commmits disorderly conduct when he knowingly... [p]ickets
or demonstrates on a public way within 150 feet of any primary or secondary school building while the school is in session and one-half hour
before the school is in session and one-half hour after the school session
has been concluded, provided that this subsection does not prohibit the
peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute.
56. 408 U.S. at 95.
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tion clause of the fourteenth amendment,"' as well as by the
first amendment. But, in either case the opinion indicates that
the real dangers presented by a Mosley-type statute are twofold: (1) it can demonstrate, upon its face or as administered,
state approval of certain content and/or disapproval of other
content; and, (2) it is improper for the state to "select which
9
issues are worth discussing or debating in public facilities.""
Even the most narrow interpretation of the first amendment
prohibits a state from acting in a manner that would support
or favor a particular point of view or side of an issue." While
not specifically stated by the Court, certainly the exclusion of
controversial issues of political or social import from public
forums would tend to preserve the status quo on such issues,
in itself possibly furthering institutional points of view.
The Court did not base its opinion on the finding of an
exhibited state point of view. Instead, the decision affirmed
the position that the subject matter of expression cannot be
considered, no matter how impartially, in determining the application of time, place, and manner statutes. However, the
relevance of Mosley to the issue of a state's power over offensive language was unclear. Mosley concerned expression that
unquestionably merited full constitutional protection. At the
time of the Mosley opinion, the status of offensive speech was
still ambiguous. Moreover, the opinion in Mosley definitively
protected expresssion only in terms of "its message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content." 60 Thus, regulations regarding parades or picketing may, consistent with Mosley, channel
57. Arguably, the equal protection clause would give speech a lesser degree of
protection, and a state the power to enforce content oriented regulations, even when
contrasted to the absolutist protection read into the first amendment by Justice Marshall. Certain speech may pose special dangers only because of the relationship of its
content to certain audiences, or because disseminated at a certain location. Even
under the strict scrutiny of laws regulating fundamental speech rights, a state could

justify differing treatment based on content if compelling state interests could be
shown. A prime example of a time, place, and manner restriction analyzed in such

equal protection terms can be found in American Mini-Theaters v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d

1014 (6th Cir. 1975). See also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 29 (U. of Chicago);
Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. C141. L. REV.
20 (1976).
58. 408 U.S. at 96; Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. at 462 n.6; Consolidated Edison Co.
v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980).
59. 408 U.S. at 96; 447 U.S. at 463; see Young v. American Mini-Theaters, 427
U.S. 50, 70 (1980).
60. 408 U.S. at 95.
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the manner in which a message is physically disseminated, so

long as the constitutional position of fully protected content is
not compromised." But Mosley left open the issue whether
the words or form of expression in which a speaker chooses to
phrase his message can be treated merely as one more manner
of dissemination, such as parades or picketing, or truly involved content.
Moreover, the authoriy of Mosley is weakened by the case
of Lehman v. Shaker Heights.a2 Mosley never maintained
that the forum in question, the school grounds, need be
opened to all speech.6 3 Rather, Mosley held that if the forum
were opened to speech, the state could not discriminate as to
the speech that could be presented on the basis of content.
Even if certain state interests might justify enhanced control
over particular forums, the decision to exercise such control
could not be based on speech content. 4 In Lehman, the Court
held that when a truly non-traditional forum is opened up to
some expression,"" the state does retain the power to disallow
other expression on the basis of subject matter. With little regard to Mosley, the Court, by concluding that the municipally
owned bus system was not a public forum, failed to present a
persuasive first amendment analysis." Instead, the Court devoted itself to an equal protection treatment of the question;
61. Traditionally, the state is concerned with preserving traffic or crowd control
against problems caused by a speaker's conduct. See note 24 supra.
A more complex situation arises when the speaker's message poses threats to the
public safety or welfare. Compare Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) with Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). Arguably, the state would still be
strictly limited in channeling speech due to such content. See Collin v. Smith, 578
F.2d 1197, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). But see 439 U.S. at 919 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
62. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
63. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
64. Mosley clearly states: "Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking
by some groups, government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on
the basis of what they intend to say." 408 U.S. at 96 (emphasis added).
65. The Court considered the bus system a commercial venture, much like a
newspaper or the broadcasting media, yet admitted that its policies involved state
action. 418 U.S. at 303. But see CBS v. National Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 114-21 (1973).
66. The Court relied heavily on Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932).
Packer concerned cigarette advertising, described as "commerical speech" proposing
only a business transaction. At that time, such speech was not constitutionally protected. Though Lehman involved advertising, the subject matter was political. The
fact that one must purchase space in which to place a message does not determine its
constitutional status; the content or the message does so. See New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
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one exhibiting a relatively low level of judicial scrutiny, somethe asserted infringewhat inexplicable in a case 6involving
7
right.
fundamental
a
of
ment
The Court conceded national reasons for limiting bus advertising to non-controversial issues, including the prevention
of an appearance of political favoritism and the protection of
a captive audience. s Until this case, however, the Court had
never allowed a state to selectively protect such audiences
from a specific subject matter. 9 In Lehman the Court overtly
recognized the ability of the state to judge which messages
will and will not offend viewers, and it sanctioned this practice with regard to speech which normally would have the fullest first amendment protection.7 0 The decision might be dismissed as an exceptionally clever case of class drawing in the
equal protection context.1 The two classes of speech involved,
commercial and political, were not considered to be similarly
situated in equal protection terms; the Court assumed that
the transit system could treat them differently so long as the
justifications were rational. Only if the system were to treat
two examples of speech within the same class differently, i.e.
the offerings of two different political candidates, would the
state be required to meet the compelling justifications required by the strict scrutiny equal protection approach.
67. The system advertising policies were required not to be "arbitrary, capricious, or invidiuous." 418 U.S. at 303.
Even though the transit system is not a public forum, and the opportunity to
advertise therein is merely a gratuitous benefit, the state may not dispense such benefit in a manner that discriminates on the basis of a fundamental right without a
compelling reason. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
68. 418 U.S. at 304.
69. But see Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970). In
Rowan, the Court found that while 39 U.S.C. § 4009 was phrased in terms of protecting a homeowner from lascivious or pandering mail, the statute allowed the homeowner to prevent further mailing from any sender whatsoever regardless of subject
matter. 397 U.S. at 737. Moreover, it was the individual who made the decision, not
the government. Id. at 735.
Arguably, Justice Douglas, whose concurrence in Lehman was based exclusively
on the capitve audience element, would not allow transit advertising and was not
sanctioning the allocation of ad space on a content-oriented basis. 418 U.S. 305-08
(Douglas, J., concurring).

70. See, e.g., A. ME1KLEJOHN,
(1948).

FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERN-

MENT

71. Frequently, the Court has avoided troublesome equal protection problems
by interpreting statutes in a manner that does not discriminate on the basis of "disfavored" classes. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (aliens v. non-aliens);
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (pregnant women v. all non-pregnant people).
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Moreover, even if the state's actions in Lehman were content-oriented, they were arguably not value-oriented. There
was no recognition by the Court either that the transit system
considered some speech content as being more worthy of
propagation than others," or that the transit system had the
power to do so. The bus system certainly could not have been
charged with having taken a stance supporting one side of a
particular issue. Yet the city might still have been charged
with speech valuing in at least one sense. Though the Court
certainly did not say that political speech had less social
worth than commercial advertising, it did indicate that political speech did not have sufficient value to overcome the particular problems that that type of speech might cause. To
sanction such an approach with regard to fully protected
speech opens the door to similar, if not more, state power to
regulate speech of less clear constitutional protection, such as
offensive language, 3 or casts the regulation in terms of the
form of expression, rather than its content. Even if Lehman
can be limited to those forums in which the government has
enhanced power to control,74 it is the first Supreme Court case
permitting the granting of dissemination rights on the basis
of the subject matter of the expression.
IV.

THE BURGER COURT'S MIDDLE YEARS

A. Dovetailing of the Issues: A Collision Between Offensive
Expression and Content Neutrality
In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,5 the Court was
called upon to resolve a confrontation between a state's power
to regulate offensive expression, if any such power remained
after the Cohen case, and the state's duty to frame the interests that it desired to protect in a content neutral manner.
The holding reaffirmed both the approach taken in, and the
result of, the Cohen case. The Court gave offensive language
72. 418 U.S. at 304.
73. At the time of Lehman, purely commercial speech was still of questionable
constitutional value itself, though political speech was not. Compare Valentine v.
Christenson, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) with Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
74. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (military base may discriminate).
But see Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (municipally
managed city theaters).
75. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
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first amendment protection, though it did not require compelling state interests to justify the regulation. The Court also
appeared to restate the rule that the applicability of time,
place, and manner regulations could not be based on content.
In Erznoznik, the challenger was convicted of violating a city
ordinance which prohibited the showing of films depicting
human nudity in drive-in theatres with screens visible from
public streets. 7 6' While ultimately reversing the conviction on
grounds of overbreadth," the Court weighed the specific facts
of the case, as it had done in Cohen and balanced the state's
justifications for the ordinance against the degree of infringement on first amendment interests.
In response to the city's claim that it was attempting to
protect citizens against an unwilling exposure to offensive material, Justice Powell's majority opinion stated:
[W]hen the government, acting as censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech
on the ground that they are more offensive than others,
the First Amendment strictly limits its power. Such selective restrictions have been upheld only when the speaker
intrudes on the privacy of the home, or the degree of capfor the unwilling viewer or autivity makes it impractical
78
ditor to avoid exposure.
The Court did not totally denigrate the importance of an
unwilling viewer's sensibilities. Rather it expressed that the
damage to those sensibilities, and the ease with which the
viewer could avoid further harm, were insufficient to balance79
away the right of willing viewers to receive such expression,
an interest not expressly considered in Cohen. The Court supported viewers' rights to see such movies at a drive-in thea76. Section 330.313 of the Jackonsville, Florida, Municipal Code (Jan. 4, 1972)
provided that:
It shall be unlawful and it is hereby declared a public nuisance ... to
exhibit, or aid or assist in exhibiting, any motion picture, slide, or other
exhibit in which the human male or female bare buttocks, human female
bare breasts, or human bare pubic areas are shown, if such... is visible
from any public street or public place.
77. 422 U.S. at 216.
78. Id. at 209 (citations omitted).
79. But see Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970). In
Rowan, the Court determined that the right of an unwilling viewer to avoid further
offense by being removed from a mailing list in no way lessened the access of willing
viewers. See also Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971)
(homeowners' challenge affecting rights of others to hear denied).
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tre; ° it did not appear to be important that the willing viewer
might easily find alternate access to the message.8 ' The Court
also limited its concern for the unwilling viewer's sensibilities
by emphasizing the ability to avoid further offense, rather
than the right to avoid the initial offense."2 Yet the result can
be considered merely a case of a one-sided balance between
two relatively minor degrees of inconvenience rather than a
specific holding that, in balancing the interests of the willing
and the unwilling recipient, a position supporting free speech
should always be adopted.
Aside from the Court's explicit recognition of the rights
of the willing recipient, 83 the decision also confronted an issue
not fully considered in Cohen: a state's power to protect children. While recognizing the state's interest in its children, the
Court's analysis implied that the only government interest involved in this case was that of the state acting as parent to
supervise the development of minors, rather than the role the
state may also play in supporting the actual parent's decisionmaking role in raising a child. 4
The Court seemed to view the city ordinance as an attempt to protect the child from viewing nudity per se, and
therefore the ordinance was held to be overbroad. While implicitly affirming the state's power to adopt a standard of obscenity for children more lenient 8 than the adult standard set
80. 422 U.S. at 211 n.7.
81. The ordinance clearly left indoor theatres unaffected. Id. at 208. Cf. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) (alternate access not ground for limiting
expression).

82.

422 U.S. at 210-11 (speaking in terms of "further" bombardment). See also

Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
83. The majority also cited the rights of the theater operator in question to
show these films. 422 U.S. at 217 n.16. See also Joseph Burstyn Co. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495, 502 (1962). But see Young v. American Mini-Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 78 n.2
(1976) (rights of theater operator are merely economic and therefore deserving of little first amendment protection).
84. Compare Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (interest of state in
child may supersede parent's rights to direct child's behavior) with Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (state interest in assisting parent when latter not available
to control child's decisions).
85. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). That standard requires that
such material: "(i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful, or morbid interest of minors, (ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community
as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and (iii) is utterly
without redeeming social importance for minors." Id. at 632-33.
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forth in Miller v. California,""clearly every example of human
87
nudity would not be held to per se violate such a standard.
Yet the Court's position left open the question of whether legitimate grounds for protecting minors might justify limitations on expression that would also affect adults. As stated by
Justice Powell:
Clearly all obscenity cannot be deemed obscene even as to
minors. Nor can such a broad restriction be justified by
any other governmental interest pertaining to minors.
Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to
some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed
solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a
legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.88
There is an implication that the state could justify a com-

parable regulation, if drawn in narrower terms and presenting
a "more particularized and compelling reason for its action.'89
A statute narrowly directed at expression that was deemed to
be offensive or indecent to minors, even though not obscene,
might be a legitimate proscription."
Erznoznik also presumes that any time the state looks to

individual images, in this case nude images, in deciding the
applicability of its regulation, the statute must be considered
content-oriented. It can be argued, however, that in such
cases, the state has not looked at the particular message con86. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). To be deemed obscene, those standards require, determination of whether: (i) the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (ii) the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (iii) the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Even though pre-dating
Miller, the statute involved in Ginsberg did specifically define the conduct prohibited. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20 (McKinney 1980).
The effect Miller may have on the third element of the Ginsberg standard has
not been faced by the Court. See Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 213 n.10. § 235.20, however,
had been amended in 1974 to substitute the phrase "[Clonsidered as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, and scientific value for minors" for "Is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors." 1974 N.Y. LAws, ch. 989 § 3.
87. 422 U.S. at 213. The Court suggested, as examples, newsreel scenes of the
opening of an art exhibit or the nude body of a war victim. To be obscene, "such
expression must be, in some significant way erotic." Id. at 213 n.10.
88. Id. at 213-14 (emphasis added).
89. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
90. But see 422 U.S. at 216 n.15 (only saving construction would be to limit
ordinance to movies obscene as to minors).

1014

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

veyed, 91 but has merely considered the manner or form of conveyance. Recognizing that form of expression as well as content may deserve constitutional protectionQ2 does not compel
a finding that form and content necessarily deserve the same
degree of protection. The City of Jacksonville could certainly
argue that, in banning public visibility of all film nudity, it
never looked to the substance of such movies, let alone made
an attempt to judge the messages that such films may have
been trying to convey. Rather, it adopted a "content-neutral"
posture, and only sought to regulate a certain manner of expression. Thus, in evaluating this arguably content-neutral
regulation of expression, the Court applied standards of review far more stringent than the law would call for. 3
The actual holding in Erznoznik may be viewed as supporting either, or both, of two speech-protective approaches:
The first may be a recognition of the fact that form and substance are not easily separable, that the protection announced
in Cohen implies that questions concerning how best to express an idea, an image, or a message are best left to the
speaker or artist. No one else can know precisely the message
sought to be conveyed and therefore how best to convey it.
For the state or the Court to attempt to edit that message
would convert the message into one phrased by the state or
the Court, respectively, and not the speaker at all. Even
though the state may not approve or disapprove the message
conveyed, 4 nor even consider substance at all, the effect of
the editor's scissors may be the same. The message may be
diluted, or at least altered. Form is content, and for the state
91. 422 U.S. at 223 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (regulations of content of certain
types of display not a restriction of any messasge).
92. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25-26.
93. In the case of content-neutral statutes, the Court generally has balanced the
interests involved without an initial presumption against the law's validity. Nor has
the Court necessarily required a state to adopt the least restrictive alternative in serving its interests. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 258-62 (1957);
Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. OFF. 204, 222 (1972).,
Thus, such statutes have been frequently upheld, even though restricting speech, but
the Court has used more than a rational basis standard. Compare Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding prohibition against using loudspeakers in a residential
area) with Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (overturning ordinance prohibiting
distribution of handbills to prevent litter).
94. Compare Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (Regulation
may be based on content if city is supporting no point of view) with Police Dep't of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (the regulation of subject matter, even if no
point of view is supported, is prohibited).
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to regulate form, it must present reasons sufficiently compelling to justify regulating the substance of any expresssion held
to be otherwise protected by the first amendment.
An alternate, and perhaps more pragmatic, view of
Erznoznik is that the Court determines whether the state regulation was improperly content-oriented by judging whether
the harm the state was seeking to prevent was caused by the
content or form of expression, or was caused by the physical
means of dissemination. This approach avoids resolving the
difficult issue of whether content-oriented regulations are motivated by the state's intent to give approval or disapproval to
particular content or expressive form. The Court could recognize that form and content are inseparable, but if either
caused a truly neutral harm, the state could act to alleviate
such harm.
Thus, in Erznoznik, the Court may have recognized the
state's power to regulate drive-in theatres solely predicated
upon an ever-changing pattern of light emanating therefrom
which causes distractions to traffic.9' This would clearly be a
content-neutral regulation of meisage or manner of presentation. Had the state been able to demonstrate that images of
nudity caused greater traffic distraction than did other screen
images, then, under this approach, the state would have
demonstrated a content-neutral justification, even though an
analysis that totally equated form with substance might not
consider it such.9 6 This was not the case in Erznoznik. There,
the state was concerned with the substance of the form, even
if not the substance of the message or the underlying themes
of the films in question. The state considered the image of
nudity to be a harmful image. Given that fact, the state, even
if not attempting to express a point of view regarding the
overall value of such an image, should be required to satisfy
the high standard of justification needed to substantively
regulate first amendment speech.
However interpreted, and even though Erznoznik was ultimately decided on a claim of fatal overbreadth, the decision
must be regarded as significantly speech protective. It af95. 422 U.S. at 215 n.13.
96. The City of Jackonsville did in fact attempt to justify its ordinance as promoting traffic safety. As such, the Court felt it was under-inclusive in singling out
nudity, unconvinced that other scenes on the screen would be any less distracting. Id.
at 214-15.
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firmed the pro-speech balance announced in Cohen; it severely limited the state's permissible interests, such as the
protection of children and its means to further them, issues
not fully faced in Cohen; and it recognized pro-speech values,
such as speaker and listener access, that Cohen had not fully
recognized. Thus, although its ground of decision did not state
that offensive or indecent speech had climbed to the upper
tier of the Court's two-tier analysis, the Court did indicate
that it had not faced a situation that persuasively argued
against such an eventual recognition.
0

B. An Immediate Retrenchment or a Clarification of Approach: Zoning as a Neutral Time, Place, and Manner
Regulation
Neither the Cohen case nor Erznoznik found competing
personal interests sufficient justifications for suppressing offensive language. Concurrently, both Erznoznik and Mosley
treated content-oriented time, place, and manner regulations
harshly, at least in situatiobs not affording an argument for
enhanced state regulatory power because the state was controlling access to a non-traditional forum. Yet such a contentoriented regulation of offensive expression was upheld a year
after the Erznoznik decision in Young v. American Mini9
Theatres.
Most surprisingly, the state's support for such a
regulation was based on the protection of economic and property values, rather than personal interests.9 8
The City of Detroit's zoning ordinance clearly singled out
a particular form of expression for special treatment in deciding the physical location at which such expression could be
disseminated.9 This particular form of expression, depicting
97.

427 U.S. 50 (1976).

98. The basic harm that the city was attempting to alleviate was the creation of
skid-row areas that attracted undesirable transients, lowered property values, caused
an increase in crime, and caused residents and businesses to move elsewhere. Id. at
55. Justice Stevens, the last member to join what may be considered the modern
Burger Court, wrote the majority opinion. Only Justice White of the last Warren
Court joined the 5-4 majority. Only Justice Blackmun, of the post-Warren appointees, joined the dissent. Id. at 88-96 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
99. The ordinance classified "adult" theaters as a "Regulated Use" which could
not be located within 1000 feet of any two other regulated uses, or within 500 feet of a
residential area. The term "Regulted Use" included ten other types of establishments, although only one, adult book stores, could be said to pose similar first
amendment problems. Id. at 52 n.3. See DETROIT, MICH., ZONING ORDINANCE, §
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certain film images clearly defined within the statute, was
classified as adult entertainment" 0 and, in all fairness, could
be considered offensive. 10 ' Having so classified such material,
the state restricted both the number and geographic location
of sites allowed to exhibit such films.
The case presented a confrontation of issues posing a significant dilemma. Given recent decisions that precluded state
restrictions on offensive language even when the state
presented plausible personal interests that might be
threatened, it would be difficult for the Court to uphold a regulation that indicated its intent was to preserve property values rather than personal values. Moreover, the Court had
made clear its hostility toward regulations which vary in impact according
to the content of the speech to which they
2
0

apply.1

66.0000 (November 2, 1972).
To be considered an adult establishment, the theater must present material distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on depicting, describing, or relating to
"Specified Sexual Activities" or "Specified Anatomical Areas." 427 U.S. at 53 n.5. See
DETROIT, MICH. ZONING ORDINANCE, § 32.0007 (November 2, 1972).
100. The fact that the Court has treated expression as entertainment rather
than information has never lessened its constitutional protection. Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). See also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495
(1962).
101. The ordinance defined the term "Specified Sexual Activites" as: "(1)
Human genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal; (2) Acts of human masturbation, sexual intercourse or sodomy; (3) Fondling or other erotic touching of human
genitals, pubic region, buttock or female breast." 427 U.S. at 53, n.46; See DETROIT,
MICH., ZONING ORDINANCE, § 32.0007 (November 2, 1972). Compare the examples of
material which the Court has expressed would satisfy the element of patent offensiveness in its present definition of obscenity:
a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate
sex acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated.
b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25(1973).
102. See text accompanying notes 54-61 supra. The Court, however, did not
directly address the equal protection issue that Mosley implied was apparent in
Young. The court of appeals had discussed the issue, and while finding the ordinance
generally permissible under the general business laws of the jurisdiction, held that it
violated the equal protection clause. It found that the infringement on free speech
was not merely incidental, but that the ordinance was applied to theaters solely with
reference to the content of the constitutionally protected material they presented.
The court therefore applied a strict scrutiny approach due to the fundamental right
involved. While conceding that Detroit might be attempting to further a compelling
interest, it deemed that the means chosen was not necessary. American Mini-Theaters v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir. 1975). But cf. Nortown Theatre v. Gribbs, 373
F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
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Nevertheless, the statute in Young was upheld on a rational basis standard, with little if any balancing of competing
first amendment interests. While constitutionally questionable, if one can accept the Court's rationale, the result is not as
logically incomprehensible as it may appear. For while the
Court admitted that the films subject to the Detroit ordinance
would not necessarily meet the Miller obscenity standard'"3 so
as to be considered, under traditional two-tier analysis, totally
unprotected speech, the expression involved was judged to be
of lesser constitutional importance than most other types of
speech. In effect, the Court set forth the proposition that the
boundary line between the two tiers was no longer an absolute
one. As the majority opinion stated:
Even within the area of protected speech, a difference in
content may require a different governmental re-

sponse ....

*104

Moreover, even though we recognize that

the First Amendment will not tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic
value, it is manifest that society's interest in protecting
this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser,
magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate that inspired Voltaire's'" s immortal comment.1
Thus, the Court officially recognized its own power to determine that some speech deserves relatively greater first
amendment protection than other speech. Given the facts in
Young, the Court clearly indicated that, while offensive language may not always be punishable for its mere utterance, it
may be treated quite differently from other protected speech
by a state's regulatory statutes, at least if such statutes are
phrased in a manner restricting only the time, place, and
manner of disseminating such expression. This enhanced state
power rests directly on the premise that some institutional
body has the ability to determine the relative value of different types of speech, or even of different messages, and to rank
103. There was no requirement that the material regulated either be found,
under contemporary community standards, to appeal to the prurient interests when
taken as a whole nor when taken as a whole, be found to lack serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 21, 26 (1973).
104. 427 U.S. at 68.

105. Voltaire's immortal comment was: "I disapprove of what you say, but I will
defend to the death your right to say it." See Id. at 63 (citing S. TALLENTYRE, THE
199 (1907)).
427 U.S. at 70.

FRIENDS OF VOLTAIRE

106.

1981]

OFFENSIVE LANGUAGE

1019

such speech in a hierarchy of varying protection. Its relative
position in that hierarchy determines the degree to which the
state can control or restrict that particular expression.
Analytically, there are flaws in the Court's reasoning in
Young. Much of the support for sanctioning the enhanced
power of Detroit to control offensive materials is based upon
cases clearly involving speech historically lacking first amendment protection. 107 Cohen and Erznoznik imply that offensive
language no longer belongs in that company. Certainly the
Court has the power to reconsider those decisions, and the degree of judicial deference given the Detroit ordinance might
suggest that it implicitly did so. But to assert that Detroit, or
the Supreme Court, may evaluate the social worth of various
types of speech, and may thereafter accord such expression
limited, and perhaps variable, degrees of first amendment
protection, is a quite different proposition that will not rest on
precedent.
Aside from the paucity of case support for such a proposition, the Court cites no philosophical or social support for its
position. It might be fair to assume that the majority of the
populace feels offensive language to be less worthy of protection than other speech, but in free speech, as in many fundamental constituional rights, majoritarian feelings are, as often
as not, the reason that the Supreme Court is a non-political
body. 108 Traditionally, unless the Court found, in good faith,
certain expression totally without social worth, it had generally assumed the role of protecting unpopular speech against
the shifting vagaries of majoritarian tastes. '09
107.

The opinion cited Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), which dealt

with juvenile obscenity, and Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973),
concerning problems caused to children by material that is obscene even for adults.
More in point were cites to the Court's treatment of commercial speech: Virginia Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S.
316 (1969).
108. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (citing
courts' special role in both protecting those rights intertwined with the political
processes, such as the dissemination of information, and also protecting discrete and

insular minorities). See, e.g., A.

BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH

(1962); Ros-

tow, The Democratic Characterof Judicial Review, 66 H~Av. L. REv. 193 (1952). Cf.
H.S. COMMAGER, MAJoRITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS (1944).
109. E.g., Young, 427 U.S. at 87-88 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (upholding a theater's right to show adult movies, despite local zoning ordinances); Brandenberg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (speech and assembly by Ku Klux Klan and members encouraging racism and violent attitudes towards the government); Street v. New York,
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Further, assuming that a regulator of speech, or the Court
itself, should be given the power to evaluate the worth of particular expression, the Court offers no guidance on how that
power is to be exercised, on what factors such an evaluator
should consider, and how relevant any given factor should be.
Even if it is conceded that it has the power to do so, the practical difficulties of overseeing such a process, in light of the
opportunity for censorship by the evaluator, would seem a judicial burden the Court would not want to assume." 0 The
Court has always been alert to the threat of time, place, and
manner statutes written in language sufficiently ambiguous to
afford those applying them to consider speech content, and
thus impose message censorship in the guise of furthering totally content-neutral state interests."' The difficulty of adequately supervising such applications becomes truly intractable when the regulator is given authority not only to look to
subject matter, but to evaluate its worth in determining the
degree or manner in which the expresion will be disseminated
to the public.
The implications of Young can perhaps be limited. While,
at first glance, Young appears to elevate property interests
above personal interests, this very fact may narrow its precedental effect. Young can be viewed as a decision somewhat
peripheral to the evolving speech protection which Cohen and
394 U.S. 576 (1969) (individual's protest of the slaying of a civil rights leader by
"cast[ing] contempt upon [an American flag] by words. . ."; Bond v. Floyd, 385
U.S.
116 (1966) (state legislator openly criticizing United States' involvement in Vietnam;
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (speech and assembly protesting racial discrimination).
110. The burden would arguably be worse than that which the Court has faced
for twenty years in trying to determine the boundaries of obscene expression, in cases
where, theoretically, only a single line between protected and unprotected speech
need be drawn. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 415 U.S. 49, 78-93 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Miller, the Court altered the requirement that unprotected
speech be "utterly without redeeming social value," to a requirement that it need
only lack "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 413 U.S. at 26. This
increase in both the ambiguity of that element and in the institutional stress resulting therefrom, led Justice Brennan to argue in Paris Adult Theatre I, that the Court
should abandon, for the most part, its role in enforcing general obscenity proscriptions. 415 U.S. at 112-13.
111. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (ordinance required a religious
group to obtain a park permit before holding congregational meeting); Cantewell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305-07 (1940) (state statute prohibiting solicitation for a
religious cause without a permit); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-53 (1938) (ordinance restricting the distribution of pamphlets without a permit).
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Erznoznik considered. Detroit was, in effect, arguing that its
regulation was no more than an attempt to find a means to
divert or dilute those harmful elements associated with adult
entertainment that might depreciate property values, regardless of the sources of such depreciation. Thus, the harm that
Detroit sought to avoid was several steps removed from either
the content, or the form, of the expression that was being regulated. Detroit was not attempting to suppress any message or
even the form of its conveyance. It is arguable that Detroit
was not even attempting to suppress a harm directly caused
by a message. The impact on any particular listener of the
message, or its form, was not the harm; the harm was the deterioration of the particular neighborhood. That deterioration
was caused by the atmospheric attraction of such areas to undesirable activity that was- related only incidentally, if at all,
to particular individuals who may have been recipients of the
expression in question. In other words, Detroit never maintained that exposure to this particualr speech, in either content or form of expression, had hurt anyone at all. In fact, the
activity with which Detroit was concerned may have been
caused by individuals who had never even been exposed to
this speech. The speech merely created an atmosphere or expectation. That atmosphere seemed to create a concentration
of undesirable individuals. That concentration ultimately
caused a depreciation in property values.
. Moreover, in attempting to prevent damage to property
interest, Detroit tailored its remedy strictly in property terms.
Its solution was to regulate the location of property at which
such expression might be disseminated. 112 Thus, both the

harm and solution were property-oriented, rather than
speech-oriented, and were closely inter-connected.
Even under this analysis, however, it could be argued that
the Court exhibited a negligible degree of concern for both the
rights of a given speaker and the rights of the potential audience than previous cases might have warranted even if these
interests were only incidentally affected. For example, in
equating the speaker's interest to that of the economic motives of the film's exhibitors, 1 " the Court acted somewhat
glibly in two respects. First, the rights of the creator of a given
112.
113.

See note 99, supra.
427 U.S. at 78 n.2.
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expression, rather than the rights of the mere messenger,
should be examined. Second, the fact that either the creator
or purveyor of a given message has an economic motive has
never been held to justify a lesser degree of first amendment
protection. 1 4 The author, the recording artist and the screenwriter all have economic motives. Few, if any messages, beyond idealistically political messages, could survive such a
test.
In assessing the rights of the speaker's potential audience, the Court concluded, without a detailed consideration of
the regulation's possible effects, that alternate access was
available to that audience." 8 No particular media forum was
foreclosed to speaker or listener, no time of day prohibited, no
manner of conveyance precluded, and particular locations
foreclosed only in a limited sense." 6 The potential viewer
would have had to leave the home and seek out the material
in a public place in any event. Nor would the ordinance move
all particular theaters to an area truly inconvenient to a willing viewer, if they had not been so located prior to the
ordinance.
The fact that the ordinance is based on the message,
whether such basis is expressed as form or content, is troublesome no matter how viewed. If one thought the decision were
truly a "neutral" zoning ordinance and not speech-based at
all, the implication is that such ordinances could begin to control the time, place, and manner of all expression. On the
other hand, if one regards it as a regulation permissible only
toward particular messages or forms thereof, it is difficult to
say that such regulations are content-oriented, but not in a
disapproving sense. Even if one could regard Detroit as not
conveying any point of view toward the expression involved,
the Supreme Court, in order to uphold the city's ordinance,
expressed the attitude that the speech involved did not deserve much first amendment protection.
114. See Joseph Burstyn Co. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1962).
115. But see Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 757 n.15 (1976) (alternate auditor or viewer access not justification for suppressing advertising of prescription drugs); Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 & n.4 (1974);
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) (alternate access to speaker cannot justify abridging liberty of expression in appropriate places).
116. 427 U.S. at 53 n.3.
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THE PRESENT COURT'S POSITION

A. Offensive Radio Broadcasts: The Clear Demise of Content Neutrality
If Young is viewed as a partial withdrawal of the first
amendment protection granted offensive speech in Cohen and
in Erznoznik, that withdrawal was taken a full step further in
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.'1 7 Pacifica involved the daytime
broadcast in New York City of a record cut entitled "Filthy
Words." ' It is clear that under any fair definition of words
that contemporary society might feel are offensive to an average listener, the words frequently used in the broadcast would
have to be considered as such." 9 The broadcast was aired as a
portion of a program discussing contemporary attitudes toward the use of language, and was preceded by a stationwarning to listeners that the cut would contain sensitive language that might be considered offensive.' 20 The FCC received
a citizen's complaint concerning the broadcast, found that
Pacifica had violated programming standards relating to the
broadcast of indecent or offensive material, ' and associated
the complaint with the station's license file.' 22
The court of appeals reversed the FCC's action," ' though
it made no definitive statement concerning the Commission's
power to generally prohibit or regulate the radio broadcasting
of offensive language in all cases.'2 4 On further appeal, the Su117. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
118. George Carlin, Occupation: Foole, Cut 5, Side 2, entitled "Filthy Words"
(Little David Records, 1973).
119. For a transcript of the broadcast itself, see 438 U.S. at 751-55 app.;
Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 37-40 (D.C. Cir. 1977); In re Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation Station WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 100-02
(1975).
120. 438 U.S. at 729; 556 F.2d at 11; 56 F.C.C.2d at 94-95.
121. In Re Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation Station WBAI
(FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975). The station was held in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464
(1970), which provides: "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language
by means of radio communications shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."
122. For a detailed consideration of this practice, see Kalven, Broadcasting,
Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J.L. & ECON. 15, 21 (1967). For an excellent discussion of both the possible sanctions applicable to Pacifica and the questionable procedural stature of the case when reviewed by the Supreme Court, see Note,
FCC Empowered to Regulate Radio Broadcasts that are Indecent But Not Obscene,
52 TEMP. L.Q. 170 (1979).

123. Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
124. The FCC for the first time interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1464 to prohibit the
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preme Court was presented with a constitutional issue concerning the degree of protection afforded this radio broadcast
by Cohen and Erznoznik. It was also called upon to refine its
position on the degree to which time, place, and manner restrictions could be based on content, should previous positions
granting offensive language constitutional protection be
followed.
The Court reversed the lower court's decision, affirming
the right of the FCC in this particular case to consider the
broadcast a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1461.2 In so doing, two
broadcast of language that was not obscene. In effect it held that the definition of
indecent language was not subsumed by the standards of Miller v. California.In re
Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation Station WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d
94, 97 (1975).
The Commission defined the word "indecent" in § 1464 to include patently offensive language even if it had social value, and even if there was no appeal to prurient interests. It issued a declaratory order pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 544(e) and 47
C.F.R. § 12, and directed all licensees to refrain from broadcasting such material
when it was likely that a reasonable number of children might be in the audience.
The FCC did suggest that a broadcast in the late evening hours, prefaced by a warning to the audience at such time, might be permissible, provided the material had
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 56 F.C.C.2d at 98-100.
Thereafter, the Commission explicitly affirmed that its original ruling was intended only to channel indecent broadcasts to times of day when children most likely
would not be exposed to it, and not to place an absolute prohibition on such broadcasts. In re Petition for Clarification or Reconsideration of Citizens Complaint
Against Pacifica Foundation Station WBAI (FM), 59 F.C.C.2d 892 (1976).
The court of appeals reversed the FCC order in a 2-1 decision. Justice Tamm,
writing for the majority, heavily emphasized 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970). Section 326
provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the
Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or
signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition
shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere
with the right of free speech by means of radio communication.
Justice Tamm asserted that the Commission's position was a form of censorship
prohibited by § 326. Moreover, judging the FCC action as an order, and not solely in
reference to the Pacifica program as broadcast, he felt the order was overbroad. He
was concerned that, by deeming social value irrelevant, the FCC could prohibit the
broadcast of any material, be it Chaucer or Hemingway, that might include indecent
language. Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 17 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Justice Bazelon expressed that the first amendment itself would prohibit any restriction on the broadcast of protected speech regardless of context. He would not
allow the FCC to restrict any expression that, no matter how indecent, could not be
judged obscene under present constitutional standards. 556 F.2d at 20 & n.8.
125. The Court majority discussed attacks on the FCC's power based upon: (1)
the limitations imposed on the Commission by 47 U.S.C. § 326; (2) the Commission's
interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1464; and, (3) any limit imposed by the first amendment. Considering the first two issues as somewhat interdependent, the Court upheld
the FCC's position that § 1464 need not be interpreted to limit regulation to language
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different approaches, each of which would have sanctioned the
FCC action could have been adopted. First, it could have held
offensive language to merit full constitutional protection and
yet have found that the state here had presented compelling
reasons for restricting its dissemination. This approach would
have been an expression of a very speech protective attitude, 1' and would have implied that the FCC's future activities in this area should be narrowly proscribed. Further, this
would have also avoided both the constitutional implications
of, and the difficulty in, assigning comparative values to different types of speech, the approach that Young had appeared
to sanction. Thus, while conceding that the compelling justifications for regulatory action may depend on the content of
speech, the initial presumption of the degree of constitutional
protection would not depend on the Court's assigning a value
to the speech relating to the worth of its message or the acceptability of its form of expression.
The second approach would have been to afford speech
that involved offensive language a lesser place on the ladder of
first amendment protection. In so doing, the Court could have
balanced the same interests that it found compelling enough
to subdue protected speech in any case, but this approach
would demonstrate a less speech protective attitude. It could
also encourage further oversight of the media by the FCC on a
content-oriented basis, while strengthening the speech-valuing
approach originated in Young.
only considered obscene, thus implying that restrictions in furtherance of § 1464
should not be considered beyond the discretion of the Commission with due respect
for § 326.
But cf Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974). The Court there held that
18 U.S.C. § 1461, forbidding the mailing of "obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy,
or vile" material, should be held to restrict only that material which could be consid-

ered obscene under present constitutional standards. Id. See also United States v.
Twelve 200-Ft. Reels, 413 U.S. 123 (1973) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1462).
A majority of the Court also conceded that the Commission's actions with regard

to Pacifica Foundation were not constitutionally prohibited, even though only a plurality joined the lead opinion. The Court, however, in treating the Commission's decision only as an adjudication of the impropriety of the station's program as broadcast,
shed no light on the question of whether it was only sanctioning the "channeling" of
such material to certain limited times of day, or whether it was approving a total ban
of the material from the broadcast media. Justice Rehnquist interpreted the decision
as a total ban. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 477-78 (1980).

126.

Given that the result of a particular case might be unchanged, the Court's

attitude in approaching cases may have its own value. See McKay, The Preference
for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1182 (1959).
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The Court appears to have taken the latter position, even
though its analysis of the FCC's power to prohibit indecent or
offensive language could be said to have been an affirmance of
the balancing approach previously utilized in Cohen. The
plausible state interests to be furthered by such regulation are
basically the same as those posed in Cohen, although these
of the form used,
interests take differing dimensions in12light
7
brroadcast.
radio
public
a
Pacifica
in
B.

Protection of Privacy Interests

In Pacifica, the Court gave little value to the protection
of audience sensibilities per se,"25 but the fact that radio
broadcasts enter the sanctuary of the home has been given
great importance. 12 9 Such broadcasts might create an invasion
of substantial privacy interests, an issue discussed by the
Court, but factually lacking, in Cohen.1 80 Pacifica could be
read to have given privacy of the home an almost absolute
inviolability; yet, the opinion appears tp show more concern
for the harm offensive language might pose to the unsuspecting listener, rather than to the captive audience."' If the radio
does in fact invade the privacy of one's home, it does so only
at the listener's invitation. 82 Unlike a sound truck, no sound
127. See text accompanying notes 37-41 supra. The Court's opinion, however,
while recognizing the intrusive nature of radio broadcasts, did not rely on the frequent argument that the limited number of available frequencies justifies enhanced
regulation of the broadcast media. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367 (1969); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
This "spectrum scarcity" argument, however, is normally asserted to secure a
balance of speech interests or a fuller expression of ideas, rather than to justify limits
imposed upon broadcasting freedom. See In re Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica
Foundation Station WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 107 n.7 (1975) (Commissioner
Robinson, concurring); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 101-02 (rejecting
claim of guaranteed access for political editorials); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. at 390 (supporting fairness doctrine).
128. 438 U.S. at 749 n.27.
129. See Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (Justice Black, concurring,
stating the Court's recognition of the sanctity of the home and the right of an individual to be let alone in that "last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick." Id. at
125.). See also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (protection of the well-being,
tranquility, and privacy of the home of the highest order); Rowan v. United States
Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970).
130. 403 U.S. at 21.
131. Compare text accompanying notes 42-43 & 79-82, supra.
132. See Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 112 (1932) (distinguishing the intrusiveness of billboards from news media; there must be some seeking out by those
reading the latter).
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enters the home without the listener's permission. 3 s Moreover, even if the listener finds the invitation a mistaken one,
one has only to turn the radio off,1 34 or tune to another station
to avoid further offense. In addition, though recognizing a person's right to be insulated from distasteful experiences in the
home' 35 as opposed to more public forums, "' there are countervailing free speech interests which should be weighed, interests belonging to both the speaker and the potential
listener.
The foremost of these rights would surely be that of potential listeners to receive the broadcasts in question. 8 7 Certainly the Pacifica opinion did not totally prevent a willing
auditor from receiving Carlin's message. But requiring a listener to search out such a broadcast in the form of tapes or
records, which would certainly entail financial outlay, 8 or
133. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Saia v. New York City, 334 U.S.
558 (1948). See also Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
134. Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932). In justifying state regulations of
billboards, Justice Brandeis stated that "[tihe radio can be turned off, but not so the
billboard or street car placard." Id. at 110. See also Rowan v. United States Post
Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (upholding right of mail recipient to force sender to
discontinue sending unwanted material).
135. The only party to complain about the broadcast happened to be driving in
a car, thus outside the home, when he was offended. 438 U.S. at 730; Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1977); In re Citizen's Complaint Against
Pacifica Foundation Station WBAI (FM), 556 F.C.C. 2d 94, 95 (1975).
136. See, e.g., Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21; Public Utils. Comm'n. v. Pollack, 343 U.S.
464 (1952). The basis for the Court's distinction is difficult to perceive if it was anything more than the listener's expectations. Certainly, by leaving the home, one does
not willingly surrender the right not to be offended, nor can the Court realistically
impose upon one the duty to remain at home in order to avoid offense. If the listener
is expected to prepare for offense when leaving home, preparation is useless if the
indecent assault is confronted unexpectedly. Such a risk would seem no different
than that taken when the radio is voluntarily turned on. The listener made thedecision to let in the outside world. See, e.g., Pacifica Foundation v. FCC 556 F.2d 9, 27
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bazelon, J., concurring).
137. Though the right to receive information is often considered to go hand in
hand with the right to speak, it does not necessarily depend on the former. Even if
Carlin had no first amendment right that was infringed upon, the willing listener's
right exists. See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (right to receive
material from foreign sources beyond protection of first amendment); cf. Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right to possess unprotected pornography).
138. Such a holding will fall most heavily upon the poor, which has often led
the Court to act cautiously before approving otherwise normal time, place, and manner regulations. See, e.g, Martin v. Struthers, 309 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) ("{d]oor to
door distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people."); see also Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965
SUP. CT. REv. 1, 30 (U. of Chi. Press). Compare the Court's treatment of other state
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confining the radio listening period to one which the FCC has
deemed appropriate for such broadcasts, ' may present a degree of inconvenience to that listener far more tangible than
that caused to the unwilling auditor who must merely turn the
radio dial. Moreover, such channeling may prevent the listener from receiving and appreciating the message in the context in which it was presented.14 0 In Young, on the other
hand, the real effect of the decision was to merely change the
physical location of the forums where a willing recipient might
find the material he wished to view. In any case he was forced
to venture out into the world, and pay a specific fee to view
the material involved. In Pacifica, the Court approved the
closing of a specific type of forum to the willing recipient,
forcing him to undergo burdens he would otherwise not have
dealt with to receive the material involved. Given the floating
limits that yet exist with Pacifica,"" it may be that a willing
recipient will be forced out of the home to receive such offensive, but non-obscene, material. The willing recipient has thus
had to forego a certain degree of his own privacy. " " Even if
one believes that the unwilling auditor deserves to be protected from the initial unexpected exposure" to offensive
laws which seem to infringe fundamental rights on the basis of wealth, e.g., Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1.966) (right to vote); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to criminal appeal).
139. For a discussion of appropriate periods, see note 161 infra.
140. The expression in the instant case was aired during the course of a regularly scheduled live discussion program entitled "Lunchpail." The program consisted
of commentary as well as analysis regarding contemporary society's attitude toward
language. The Carlin material was keyed into the general discussion. In re Citizen's
Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation Station WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 95
(1975).
141. The court speaks of alternative audience access in terms of going to a Carlinconcert or buying records. 438 U.S. at 750 n.28; Id. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring).
The Court makes clear it did not confront the issue of whether the FCC would be
justified in totally suppressing the material in question rather than merely channeling
it. Id. at 750 n.28. See note 124, supra.
142. Cf., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). Stanley, however, while protecting the individual's right to possess and presumably receive the input from obscene material once obtained, did not actually protect the right to obtain the material
without leaving the home. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) (affirming validity of 18 U.S.C. § 1461 which forbids mailing obscene material, even to
willing recipient).
143. See 438 U.S. at 748-49. "To say that one may avoid further offense by
turning off the radio ... is like saying the remedy for an assault is to run away after
the first blow." Id. See also, Id. at 760 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring). "It is true that the
radio listener quickly may tune out speech that is offensive to him." Id. In a potential
audience of millions of listeners, however, only one complaint was received by the
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material when at home, it is questionable whether the harm
caused by that unexpected assault to a select few should substantially restrict the access of a potentially greater pool of
willing viewers. 14 4 To do so is a somewhat extreme advancement of the doctrine of audience censorship.
Moreover, there are additional speaker interests that are
severely harmed by the suppression of radio broadcasts. Foremost may be the speaker's right to reach a willing audience in
as many reasonable or convenient forums as possible." 4 5 Yet,
even assuming the speaker can reach a willing audience, it can
further be argued that the unwilling auditor, even in his own
home, may not have an absolute right never to hear a broadcast that may upset him, even if there were no problems of
audience censorship. While an unwilling auditor may have the
right to escape an objectionable message once heard or recognized as objectionable, the Constitution may not necessarily
insulate such listeners from any new message, no matter how6
distasteful such message may turn out to be in hindsight. '
To allow the speaker initial entry would be a compromise that
respects both the rights of the possibly willing auditors and
those of the speaker. If the speaker has a message, perhaps he
deserves the right to reach those who are least receptive to it.
Though the speaker who entertains may only wish to reach
willing listeners, the speaker who wishes to persuade probably
feels no overwhelming need to persuade those who are already
in agreement with him. Thus, aside from the interests of those
who may be familiar with Carlin and may want to hear him,
but are discouraged by the inconvenience that the government
has imposed upon them, one must consider Carlin's right to
reach listeners who are not familiar with his work. In fact, if
the Court's recognition of alternative listener access is taken
FCC. Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
144. But cf. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
Title 39, section 4009 of the United States Code (Supp. IV 1964), allows the recipient
of unwanted mail to force the sender to remove his name from the sender's mailing
list. Such action, however, does not infringe on the rights of willing recipients to receive such mail. Rowan also supports the position that the individual, rather than the
government, has the responsibility to censor his input. 397 U.S. at 735. Cf. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
145. See note 115 and cases cited therein supra.
146. But cf. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970),
where the recipient of the unwanted message normally acted only after receiving an
initial mailing. See also Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to be Spoken to?, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 153 (1972).
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literally,' 7 then the people whom Carlin will ultimately reach
are those to whom his message has least significance, those
who are already attuned to his point of view. When viewed in
this light, it can be said that the FCC's action substantially
abridged the dissemination of Carlin's message, regardless of
whether one is viewing it from the perspective of the speaker
or the potential listener. Whether or not the speaker's rights
in this regard should overbalance the privacy interests of the
unwilling auditor, the Court should recognize such rights in
order to effect a truly fair balancing of all interests involved.
C. Protection of Children
Perhaps the most persuasive state justification for controlling offensive language is the protection of children, presumably on the assumption that, in situations calling for mature judgment or decision-making where substanial harm
might result from an improper decision, the state may step in
and exercise judgment for those lacking such maturity. " 8 In
so doing, the state may act in two different roles. The first
presumes that the state itself has an interest in the development of its young, which interests will be furthered by controlling the input of potentially harmful material to children
from any source. Alternately, the state may be acting to support, rather than supplant, the child-rearing role of the parent
by controlling the input of controversial material to the child
in situations where the actual parent may be unable to fully
exercise his own choice. " "9
In Pacifica, the Court failed to clarify the role in which
the state is presumed to be acting. If the state is attempting
to promote or protect its own interest in the development of
children, the limits of its power has been clearly expressed in
Ginsberg v. New York. 150 In Ginsberg, the Court indicated
147. A willing audience would have to make a substantial affirmative effort to
receive the materials in question. See note 124 supra; note 161 infra. A fair presumption is that a number of people have foregone listening to or viewing material of some
interest because of the financial outlay or physical effort involved in obtaining it.
148. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-75 (1976)
(pregnant minor's right to abortion without parental permission); Ginsburg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (sales of obscene magazines to minors); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (statute prohibiting minors from selling merchandise in
public places).
149. Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968).
150. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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that a state's authority to protect a child from exposure to
ideas or images deemed potentially harmful is limited to expression defined as obscene. This definition is parallel, though
not equivalent, to the definition of obscenity relating to the
dissemination of such material to adults. 151 Implicit in the
Court's formulation of the adult definition was the conclusion
that obscene language carried so little social value that it was
not first amendment speech at all, and could therefore be restricted by the state for any rational reason. " The same approach was applied to the minors' standard. However, all expression that failed this standard was deemed totally
unprotected as to children, and therefore the state was empowered to restrict the dissemination of such material to minors so long as it could rationally believe that the material
presented a harm to children."'
One might argue that Pacifica implied an analogous approach for controlling offensive expression. A state might impose a definitional standard for language offensive to children
encompassing expression that would not be deemed offensive
to adults. Yet to justify total suppression of that language as
to children poses doctrinal difficulties. The Court has judged
that offensive language is not absolutely prohibitable, that
such speech can have social utility and therefore deserves
some constitutional protection.15 Although loosening the definition of obscene language while applying it to children increased the scope of unprotected speech, an analogous loosening of the definition of offensive language does not
automatically deem that language unprotected. Analytically,
then, to suppress such expression, even as to children, the
Court should carefully scrutinize the interests involved, either
at the definitional stage or at the stage of balancing the competing state and countervailing free speech interests. At one
stage or the other, the Court should require the regulator to
clearly present and substantiate the existence of the harm it is
attempting to prevent. Instead, in Pacifica, the Court did not
question the Federal Communications Commission's assumption that offensive language presents some speculative harm
151. See note 85 supra.
152. Roth v. United State, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
153. 390 U.S. at 643 (not irrational for legislature to find such material harmful
to minors).
154. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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to the young. The justification for the restriction seemed little
more than acceptance of the presumption that a child is too
young to appreciate the full capacity of choice that is the presupposition of first amendment guarantees.""5
Had the Court, in Pacifica, treated offensive expression
as presumptively protected, it should have demanded compelling reasons for suppression. It should have also placed a burden upon the regulator to demonstrate why the remedy of further discussion, even with respect to the child auditor, would
insufficiently protect the government's interest. 156 Implicit in
such a position is the presumption that the first amendment
rights of children also deserve recognition sufficient to force
the regulator to justify its abridgement of those rights.5 7 This
would seem especially so if the speech in question relates, in
nonviolent terms, to social attitudes, values, or mores. Unless
one assumes that the present status quo satisfies the visions of
those who authored the Constitution, one must presume that
they foresaw that values, mores, and questions of acceptability would change, and probably be changed, by the fullest discussion of all issues, not only by those whose systems of values
were fully formed, but also by those whose value systems were
in the process of forming. 5 8 To preclude the young from hear-

ing or considering new, radical, or even distasteful images of
the possible future, would be to affirmatively preserve the status quo. That would appear to be a constitutionally impermissible interest advanced through the suppression of speech.
Pacifica differed from the Ginsberg case in one other obvious regard. The difference between the adult and juvenile
definitions set forth in Ginsberg did not restrict adult access
to material protected as to them.5 9 After Ginsberg, the adult
155.

390 U.S. at 648-50 (Stewart, J., concurring). See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM
496-97 (1970).
156. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97
(1977) (quoting Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California, 247 U.S. 357, 377 (1927):
"If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert
the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not
enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression.")
157. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969); Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 212-13. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

(right to teach German in schools resting partly on opportunities of students to acquire knowledge).
158. See Comment, Exclusion of Children from Violent Movies, 67 COLUM. L.
REV. 1149, 1158 (1967).
159. But cf. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).

1981]

OFFENSIVE LANGUAGE

1033

found access to such material in the same places where it had
always been found. After Pacifica, the means adopted to promote minors' interests curtails adult access to material which
as to them is protected by the first amendment.'
An alternative analysis of the FCC's assertion of the importance of protecting children is that the Commission is preserving parental prerogatives to decide acceptable input into
the child's developmental process in situations that the parents are unable to control, either because they are not present
for certain periods of time or because of the inherent impracticability of controlling certain forms of media such as radios.
If the Supreme Court opinion in Pacifica is viewed as sanctioning no more than the FCC's ability to channel offensive
" ' this contention might be
language to certain times of day,16
the strongest support for the holding. Such channeling would
not be a total suppression of the speech involved, even with
respect to children. Total suppression would be an implicit
admission by the FCC that it was not acting in a manner that
would truly preserve parental prerogatives, for it must be assumed that there are some parents who would wish their children to receive Mr. Carlin's message, irrespective of the stance
the FCC might take regarding the message's acceptability.' 62
There are, however, analytical difficulties inherent in this
position. If the FCC is acting in the role of parental support,
160. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (protection of minors not adequate to justify supression of nonobscenity); text accompanying notes 33-53 supra.
161. The original FCC order banned indecent speech whenever it was reasonably likely that children would be in the audience. In re Citizens Complaint Against
Pacifica Foundation Station WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98-99. Presumably, that
may have prevented the broadcast of the material in Pacifica except in the very early
morning, though the order did suggest that during the late evening hours a different
standard "might conceivably be used." Id. Upon reconsideration, the FCC states it
"never intended to place an absolute prohibition on the broadcast of" indecent language; rather it "sought to channel [the broadcast] to times of day when children
most likely would not be exposed." In re Petition for Clarificaiton or Reconsideration
of a Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation Station WBAI (FM), 59
F.C.C.2d 892, 892 (1976). The court of appeals' opinion seemed to treat the FCC
order as improper, regardless of whether it was read as an absolute ban or mere channeling. Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9,13 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Tamm, J.); Id. at
27 n.28 (Bazelon, C. J., concurring).
The Supreme Court's treatment of the question is no more definitive. While
treating the FCC's action as only an adjudication that Pacifica had acted improperly,
the opinion left unstated whether the material involved could properly be broadcast
at a later listening hour. See note 124 supra.
162. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 770 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
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it has either assumed that most parents would not wish their
children to be exposed to such material, or it has decided that
a minority group of parents should be able to exert at least a
limited degree of audience censorship, imposing the burden
upon the majority of parents seeking alternate access for the
child.'63 In either case, however, this position may be more
defensible than controlling adult access. In instances of parental censorship, the child may be a willing listener, without the
full capacity to comprehend what he is hearing, but the issue
of willingness truly belongs to the parent, who is not available
to turn the radio dial. Such an argument supports the particular means adopted by the regulator in Pacifica, though the argument must still rest upon the prevention of a harm that the
case did not clearly enunciate. Moreover, accepting such
means as workable' should not cloud the fact that countervailing interests in Pacifica may have been severely infringed.
If the real interest being furthered in Pacifica is the protection of parental prerogatives in the raising of a child, admittedly an important state interest, this interest has historically
been offered to support the fundamental right to speak and
the right to listen, rather than to overbalance them.' 5 Therefore, parents willing to have their children receive the widest
array of available input could argue that those same fundamental rights, to speak and to listen, have been infringed.
Thus, the Court may face a "zero sum" argument, making it
even more questionable why the Court should allow the Federal Communications Commission to tip the balance in favor
of the unwilling parent, given the negative effect of such a po163. See text accompanying note 108 supra.
164. Arguably, channeling the material involved to as late as 11:00 P.M. or
12:00 A.M. would still not prevent substantial numbers of minors from receiving the
program in any reasonably sized metropolitan area. See Pacifica Foundation v. FCC,
556 F. 2d 9, 19 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bazelon, J., concurring). Conversely, a significant
number of adult listeners or viewers may have ceased listening at these hours. Id. at
20 n.6.
165. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (parental right to have
child receive parochial education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (parental
right to have child receive instruction in German language). See also Runyan v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (parental right to have child hear policies of white
supremacy supported even though right to receive segregated education is not). Even
in Ginsberg, regarding unprotected speech, the Court pointed out that the law involved did not prevent a given parent from purchasing the material in question and
giving it to the child. 390 U.S. at 639.
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sition on adult interests.166
Oddly enough, Young suggests an approach that might
resolve the dilemma caused by Pacifica's apparent contentoriented regulation of adult access to protected expression. If
Pacifica is confined to approving only the FCC's right to protect the interests of children, and, despite the actual opinion,
is read to require compelling reasons for restricting child access, then any effect of the FCC order on adult access could
be treated as merely incidental. The FCC order could then be
interpreted as only content-based in terms of the harmful effect of offensive language upon children. Therefore, the FCC
expressed no point of view regarding the acceptability of the
material to adults, nor did it attempt to prevent any harm to
adults that was speech-related. In Young, the city ordinance
was concerned with the effect of speech upon property, not
listeners. Here, the FCC would argue that it is concerned with
the effect of speech upon children, not adult listeners. The effect of the order on children's rights, it is once more presumed, would require a showing of compelling need. Even
though adult interests might also be affected, such effect is
incidentally caused by a regulation that is speech-neutral regarding adult rights and speech-related harms.
While such an analysis could reduce Pacifica to little
more than an application of Young, it is a different analysis
than that used by the Court. Rather, the Court seemed to
treat the expression in Pacifica as presumptively unprotected
speech with regard to children, with little consideration for
the competing interests of either the child or adult listener.
D.

Assessing the Value of Speech

Assuming the validity of various governmental interests
in limiting the broadcast in the Pacifica case, the Court never
referred to such interests as compelling. The Court's ultimate
opinion appeared to rest on the fact that the offensive language used could be abridged on lesser grounds than speech
that is afforded full first amendment protection. 167 In essence,
166. Perhaps recognizing this effect, a proposed legislative draft to protect children from obscenity included the following proviso: "Exemption for Broadcasts-The
prohibition of this section shall not apply to broadcasts or telecasts through facilities
licensed under the FCC Act, 47 U.S.C. § 301, et seq." See, THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, 66-67 (1970).
167. The plurality opinion cited Justice Murphy's statement in Chaplinsky

1036

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

the Court must have decided either that words chosen to express an idea are not truly related to content,1 68 or else, assuming that words are content, that some content is of less
worth than others. 169 In support of the former position, Justice Stevens stated that "[a] requirement that indecent language be avoided will have its primary effect on the form,
rather than the content, of serious communication. There are
few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of
less offensive language. 1 70 There may arise cases where this is
so;' 7 ' where, in effect, the Court can say it has done no more

than regulate the manner of the speaker's expression. But, in
such cases the words are truly gratuitous, unrelated to the
speaker's message.7 2 In the Pacifica case, the words the
speaker chose were in no way prefatory or casually spoken.
The words were selected because the content of the message
concerned those very words: content dictated manner. 77 To
say that the elimination of such words would have not diminished the import or effect of the message requires a judgment
the Court is ill-equipped to make, and perhaps one the Court
should not have the authority to make. The assertion that
form and message are separable may depend on what the message is. In Pacifica, the majority opinion never appeared to
consider the intent of Carlin's message. This lack of consideration highlights the one free speech interest the Pacifica
Court apparently neglected: the particular artist's choice of
which implied that such language deserves no protection but appeared to ultimately
balance some protection away. See text accompanying notes 129-165 supra.
168. 438 U.S. at 761 (Powell, J., concurring).
169. The plurality opinion would admit that the FCC order was based on content. Id.at 744. It adds that, historically, the Court has looked to content and context
in judging the validity of state regulations on expression. Its precedental support,
however, consists of cases concerning speech that is outside the first amendment, e.g.,
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)
(libel of private citizens), with two exceptions, Young v. American Mini-Theaters, 427

U.S. 50 (1976) (zoning to restrict "adult" entertainment) and Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (commercial speech).
170. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 736 n.18 (Stevens, J., in separate opinion).
171. See, e.g., WUHY-FM, Eastern Educ. Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970).
172. Id. at 415 (use in speech of phrase "S-.t, man" evaluated as a repetitive
introductory phrase and "f
g" or "mother f
g" as repetitive adjectives).
173. Any version of Carlin's message would be difficult to present with any degree of precision without using some of the offensive language he used. See George
Carlin, Occupation; Foole, Cut 5, Side 2, entitled "Filthy Words" (Little David
Records) (1973); 438 U.S. at 751-55.
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the mode in which to express his message or point of view. 7 "
The words that a particular speaker chooses "may often be
the more important element of the overall message ..

The Pacifica case is one of the best examples of form and content, or more accurately stated, form and message, totally
merged. The message in that particular instance concerned
the harmlessness of certain words. Perhaps the speaker in-

tended no more than a childish challenge to authority in stating them. If so, he phrased his message very effectively. Alternatively, his purpose may have been to offend his audience; 77 67
to show them how truly harmless their sensibilities were.1
His intent may have been to show that words utilized in modern conversation are rarely used to denote the particular ob-

jects or images that the state is attempting to suppress by restricting those words.17 8 Whatever the speaker's intent may
have been, it is questionable to assert that the message would
have been equally effective if phrased in different terms. In
Pacifica it would have been virtually impossible to have disassociated the form of expression, if such was defined in terms

of the words used, from the message to be conveyed.
On the other hand, if form and content are inseparable, it
can be argued that the Court actually sanctioned an approach
to "offensive" speech that truly assigns a value to the message

itself. 7 9 To allow the suppression of certain words, while admitting that such suppression may impinge or destroy the effectiveness of the underlying message, assumes that the Court

has placed a relative value on the underlying message that is
174. Note Justice Holmes' statement that "[a]word is not a crystal, transparent
and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and
content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." Towne v.
Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
175. 438 U.S. at 774 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26).
The Cohen Court also noted that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric." Id. at 25.
176. Should the Court consider intent a relevant factor, whether the Court
would focus upon the speaker's immediate, presumably harmful, intent or upon the
ultimate intent is unclear. See Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972) (mem.)
(Powell, J., dissenting).
177. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 746 n.22. A comparison to the use of obscene
language while proselytizing the harmlessness of obscene words is not totally apt because obscenity is constitutionally unprotected.
178. Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 23 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bazelon,
C.J., concurring).
179. Under that assumption, apparently five Justices did value the speech content, despite Justice Powell's disclaimer. 438 U.S. at 761-72. (Powell, J., concurring
opinion).
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inferior to certain state interests. However, these same interests are deemed insufficient to justify suppressing fully protected speech. Thus, the Court has upheld the government's
power to treat offensive forms of expression differently from
fully protected speech, regardless of the fact that form may be
fully equated with content.
In those terms, the Court's desire to devalue such speech
in order to allow regulation is understandable. By admitting
that form and content are inseparable while supporting the
FCC order, the Court would be approving regulation based
upon content. However, the Court does not authorize such
content-consciousness in controlling all speech. Thus, offensive speech must be devalued so that its different treatment is
justified without upsetting the presumption that protected
speech may be suppressed only for the most compelling
reasons.
If given expression has any protection at all, the Court
presumably would neither allow the subject matter to be withdrawn from the arena of public debate, nor, under any interpretation of Young, allow a state to express its point of view
with respect to that subject. But in Pacifica, by allowing the
partial or total foreclosure of a given means of disseminating
the message, it could be argued that the FCC has been allowed to withdraw this subject matter from the arena of public debate. In doing so, it has implicitly adopted a point of
view. It has asserted that these particular words are harmful
and in fact pose the very dangers that Carlin's message professed to denounce. Moreover, the state has taken a position
that will certainly tend to preserve the status quo, to insure
the continued conception of the words in question as posing a
degree of harm and thus implicitly justifying the state's own
continued authority to suppress them. Therefore, it is not
only expressing a point of view but one that will perpetuate
the state's own interests.
E.

The Most Recent Word: Content Oriented Regulations

In Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. v.
Public Service Commission of New York,' 80 the Court established that governmental restrictions on the time, place, or
180. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
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manner of exercising free speech rights can be based only
upon the content of a message deemed to deserve less than
full constitutional protection. The majority opinion, in fact,
seemed to go further, disallowing all content-oriented regulation unless narrowly drawn and justified by a compelling state
interest.18 1 In effect, the Court appeared to retreat to the
182
equal protection approach central to the Mosley case. Thus,
it could be argued that Pacifica was something of an aberration; that the proper judicial approach would be to consider
all speech deemed worthy of first amendment protection to be
of equal value, allowing differing governmental treatment
based upon content to be supported only under the tightly
limited standards of strict scrutiny.
However, the case is also open to the interpretation that
83
the specific expression involved, clearly political in nature
and phrased in a non-offensive form, was assumed by the
Court to be the most highly valued first amendment speech,
and, the Court intended to imply that lesser-valued expression was subject to different standards of governmental regulation. Alternatively, the Court may have intended that its
prohibition of content-orientation be taken literally, implicitly
regarding Pacifica as pertinent to the form of the message and
not involving true content regulation. In ConsolidatedEdison,
the value of the underlying message was not the distinguishing factor, but rather the fact that the message was conveyed
in an unoffensive manner.18 4 In either case, Consolidated
Edison is also significant because in surveying the compelling
state interests that might justify content-based reulation, the
Court clearly dismissed the state's interest in protecting the
unwilling audience, even from exposure within the confines of
the home. Notwithstanding the privacy interests granted the
sensitive auditor in that situation, the Court stated that the
rights of the speaker outweighed the momentary offense po18
tentially imposed upon the unsuspecting recipient. As such,
181. Id. at 540.
182. See text accompanying notes 54-61, supra.
183. The utility company had inserted material in monthly bills advocating the
benefits of nuclear power. 447 U.S. at 532.
184. Justice Stevens was the only member of the Court to argue this distinction.
He asserted that the regulation was based on content, but viewed Pacifica as involving a form of communication that was "too ugly in a particular setting." Id. at 547
(Stevens, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 541-42. If the offensive message is mailed, however, the unwilling
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the case seemed to remove one of the basic underpinnings of
the Pacifica case, reducing the supportable state interests in
that case to those of protecting the rights of children. However, it is unclear whether Consolidated Edison would apply
to a case where the form of the expression, rather than the
content of the message, was the source of the unwilling recipient's harm.
Although some questions were left open, Consolidated
Edison does indicate that the concept of content valuation
condoned in Young and Pacifica will not be carried over to
diminish the protection afforded to those types of expression
traditionally held fully protected by the first amendment.
Consolidated Edison may indicate that the Burger Court has
set out upon a one-way street, giving historically unworthy
speech some protection, while making it clear that it in no
way intends to withdraw protection from speech that has always been fully protected.
VI.

THE FIRST TEN YEARS OF THE BURGER COURT

The Court's treatment of offensive language during the
last ten years has been somewhat mixed. On one hand, the
Court has taken a cautious step in favor of free speech interests in affording offensive language at least limited first
amendment protection. 86 On the other hand, the Court seems
to have taken a significant step backward by sanctioning the
use of content-oriented time, place, and manner regulations in
restricting any expression that has been afforded first amendment protection.1 87 The Court's willingness to engage in the
relative valuing of different- kinds of speech must be regarded
as a major element of this retreat.188
Even the cautious step forward should be viewed with a
degree of skepticism. If the Burger Court had elevated offensive language from the second tier in the two-tier analysis,
viewer need only be offended once; further offenses may be precluded without giving
up the right to receive mail generally. This would be more difficult with radio broadcasts, though avoidance of "offensive" frequencies might suffice. Id. at n.11. But cf.
Bowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
186. In Pacifica, however, the plurality opinion quotes the portion of Chaplinsky that has traditionally been relied on to justify the exclusion of offensive language
from all first amendment protection. 438 U.S. at 746. See note 14 supra.

187. Compare the judicial attitude expressed in Mosley. See text accompanying
notes 54-62 supra.
188. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 743; Young, 427 U.S. at 70-71.
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half-way through its first decade, offensive speech has since
fallen into some middle tier of partially protected speech. In
fact, the only true advancement made by the Court may be
the apparent willingness to overtly balance free speech values
in this limited area, rather than to covertly balance those issues at the definitional stage of its analysis. However, it may
be argued that this middle level of protected speech does not
exist, 189 for, if offensive speech had truly been given constitutional protection, the Court would require regulating bodies to
produce "compelling" rather than merely "rational" reasons
for curtailing such expression. Thus, the judicial standard set
is little higher than that relating to totally unprotected
speech. 190
For example, the Pacifica decision did not specifically address the issue of harm that offensive language may pose to
children.1 9 ' To assert that the state has a greater interest in
protecting the young than in protecting adults may be both
2
philosophically and legally supportable," but that contention

does not address the particular harm which is sought to be
avoided. The harm was never clearly enunciated, nor was it
based upon legislative facts that would support its exis-

tence. 9 ' This degree of judicial leniency is typically associated
with a minimal substantive due process analysis, another indi-

cation that the Court was not dealing with the infringement of
a fundamental right.
189. The impact of this statement may be limited to offensive language only. In
contrast, the Court's more recent holdings in the area of commercial speech have
solidified, rather than undermined, the position that commercial speech deserves a
differing degree of constitutional protection than that afforded to expression resting
on either of the traditional two tiers. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (affirming protection of commercial
speech but subject to regulation furthering "substantial" state interest). But cf.
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (prohibiting use of misleading trade names).
190. Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 540 (law regulating speech content must
be precisely drawn to serve compelling state interest).
191. 438 U.S. at 746 n.23. The Court quoted the Federal Communications Commission's findings that the language involved had the effect of "debasing and brutalizing human beings by reducing them to their mere bodily functions." In re Citizen's
Complaint against Pacifica Foundation Station WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98
(1975). It added that "Pacifica's broadcast could have enlarged a child's vocabulary in
an instant." 438 U.S. at 749.
192. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
193. But cf. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 642. There, the Court admitted that the
threatened harm was subject to disputed scientific debate but sanctioned the state
regulation as a rational attempt to restrict unprotected speech. Id. at 641, 643.
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In addition, assuming the existence of legitimate state interests conceivably harmed by the unrestricted use of offensive speech, it is not at all clear that the Court is balancing
the value of the countervailing free speech interests against
those potential harms. The fear of momentary offensiveness to
an unsuspecting listener supercedes the rights of the speaker
and willing listener."" The burden is placed on the person
seeking the free dissemination of speech rather than on one
seeking to curtail its dissemination. Thus, it could be asserted
that the Court has taken the position that, although offensive
language can no longer be defined away, it can be balanced
away given any plausible reason for doing so. Perhaps the labels have changed, but the contours of protected speech have
not. If so, the Burger Court has not brought offensive speech
within the mantle of the first amendment, but rather has affirmed its unprotected position.
A more positive anarysis is that offensive language has
been placed at some middle level of protection. It may be argued, however, that this middle tier should not exist; once the
Court has recognized that certain speech deserves first
amendment protection, it must perforce be given full protection. The Court's role may be to determine whether given
speech has any value, but not to decide degrees of value once
protection is admitted to exist. It is this latter role that has
raised the specter of message-based censorship which previous
courts have been so careful to foreclose. 19 5
Even if constitutionally permissible, the institutional difficulties in allowing content-based time, place, and manner
regulations upon certain speech seem insurmountable.
Pacifica appears to authorize a state to determine whether
given speech is sufficiently valuable to be heard, based on audience composition, time, and manner of expression." But
the Court has yet to deal with the question of how, assuming
one is to evaluate the worth of speech in order to understand
the extent to which it may be restricted, that evaluation is to
take place and what elements are relevant to that decision.
Consequently, the Court has also not established guidelines
for reviewing decisions of regulatory agencies, such as the
194.
195.
(1948).
196.

See text accompanying notes 131-144 supra.
See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1980); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558
438 U.S. at 743, 746.
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FCC. 197
Analytically, there will always remain an inherent degree
of speech-valuing if the two-tier approach is retained. But the
task of assigning relative values to speech can be avoided by
placing each form of speech, such as offensive expression, on
one of those two levels. Thus, the Court could give offensive
language full Constitutional protection, while retaining the
equal protection approach set forth in Mosley and apparently
reaffirmed in ConsolidatedEdison.198 This approach would allow the state room to curtail certain speech explicitly based
on message, content, or form, provided that the restrictions
were narrowly drawn to protect compelling1 99 and specific interests, most likely structured to protect the rights of minors.
A regulation channeling the expression away from an audience
whose peculiar composition threatened harm, while leaving
reasonable accessability to receptive audiences, would seem
the kind of narrowly drawn regulation that such an approach
would approve.2 00 This may be what was sanctioned in
Pacifica, but the Court did not speak in terms of compelling
interests nor narrowly drawn statutes. However, the difference
is more than mere labelling, for the latter approach takes a
speech-protective attitude in favor of the free dissemination
of speech.2 0 ' It would also provide all interested parties a
more predictable analytical approach towards resolving their
particular claims.
The present Burger Court's "cautious" approach, so long
as it does not result in the valuation of all speech on a wideranging scale, may merit support. "Offensive" language has
been so labeled by the court because the mere utterance of
such words, even if they possess a certain worth, will offend
some people. Even if such words should be deemed worthy of
even the slightest degree of constitutional protection, and
thus "balanced away" by their limited social value, the impact
of their utterance would still be admitted. If the Pacifica case
is evaluated as mere speech channeling, although the true impact was not discussed in terms of the resultant infringement
on other free speech values, this approach could enable the
197. See note 110 supra.
198. See text accompanying notes 180-185, supra.
199. See 447 U.S. at 540.
200. But see notes 125 & 161 supra.
201. See McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1182 (1959).
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Court to increase the protection of otherwise traditionally un-

protected speech in a piecemeal but positive manner.20 2 It is
conceivable that the Court could ultimately bring other forms
of unprotected speech, besides offensive language, into the
outer limits of first amendment protection by conceding that
such speech may pose harm, but affording it a quantum of
protection that would minimize such harm. By alleging certain expression to be "offensive," the state could validly channel the communication in a manner most protective of the
state's asserted, even if unproven, compelling interests. The
Court would thus afford protection to state interests that previously rendered such expression totally unprotectable, while
simultaneously recognizing the constitutional right of the willing recipient to receive such expression. Even if the Court erroneously placed certain speech at the outer limits of the first
amendment, the expression would not be completely curtailed, although it would be made somewhat more inaccessible. Moreover, a present unwilling recipient may ultimately
reconsider his or her initial decision, a factor which could
someday facilitate presently unacceptable expression gaining
the mantle of acceptance. Therefore, despite the absence of a
detailed analysis of certain competing interests that arguably
should have been condsidered, the outcome in Pacifica might
have justifiably been the same.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Although the Court's future course is uncertain, the decision in Consolidated Edison is reassuring. It makes clear the
Burger Court's intent to adopt a one-way ratchet in favor of
free speech interests. That is, even though certain forms of
expression, such as offensive language, have not been given
full protection, they certainly have been protected from total
suppression. Although the Burger Court qualified Cohen in
Pacifica, determining that some protected speech may not deserve the full first amendment protection afforded to traditional "first amendment" speech, the Burger Court has, in
some cases, created an approach of partial or qualified first
amendment protection. In so doing, the Court has made it
clear that speech given full Warren Court protection will not
202.

See L.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

674-75 (1978).
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be compromised by this attempt to work formerly unprotected speech into the penumbra of first amendment protection. So long as Pacifica reflects a Burger Court approach of
speech valuing to justify a qualified protection of heretofore
totally unprotected speech, the first ten years of the Burger
Court may represent a timid step forward.

